NLRB to Ask Supreme Court if Board Members Were Lawfully Appointed

Earlier this week, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”) announced it will petition the United States Supreme Court to review Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013). As previously reported, in Canning the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that three appointments of officers to the NLRB by President Obama were unconstitutional because they lacked the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate and were not authorized by the Constitution’s so-called Recess Appointments Clause. As a result, the Court concluded that the NLRB does not have the quorum necessary to issue decisions or otherwise act. The Canning decision arguably invalidates hundreds of opinions rendered by the Board this past year. Employers should stay tuned for updates on the NLRB’s petition, and feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department regarding any questions about the decision in Canning or prior NLRB rulings.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

A Friendly Reminder that the NLRB Workplace Posting Requirement Has Been Postponed Indefinitely

Now well over a year ago, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or “NLRB”) issued a rule requiring most private sector employers to post a notice of employee rights to unionize in their workplaces. The posting requirement was initially to take effect on November 14, 2011. The requirement was postponed, first, until January 31, 2012, and, then again, until April 30, 2012 in light of legal challenges to the rule. Prior to the April 2012 “effective date,” the NLRB announced that it would once again postpone the rule—this time indefinitely “until the legal issues are resolved.” As recently reported, the Board’s great laid plans may go further awry in light of a federal appellate court decision challenging the NLRB’s ability to take any further action until at least one more Board Member is lawfully appointed. For answers to questions regarding the posting, or the Boards's current state of affairs, please feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Federal Appellate Court Deems NLRB Appointments Unconstitutional

In a groundbreaking opinion, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has ruled that three appointments of officers to the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”) by President Barack Obama were unconstitutional because they lacked the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate and were not authorized by the Constitution’s so-called Recess Appointments Clause. As a result, the Court vacated the underlying Board decision that gave rise to the appeal, concluding that the NLRB had no authority to issue the decision because only two of its five members were validly appointed. Thus the Board lacked the quorum necessary for it to take action. The ruling has widespread implications for the NLRB as well as the President’s overall “recess appointment” powers.

The Court’s decision, Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), arguably invalidates hundreds of opinions rendered by the Board this past year. Some of these decisions have been controversial, such as the Board’s recent decision that seemingly innocuous language found in employment policies unlawfully restrains workers’ rights to unionize. And the Canning decision may end the longstanding Presidential practice of appointing government officers, like Board Members, when the Senate is not on a formal recess in between Senate sessions.

Notably, the Canning decision is at odds with a decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 2004 upholding President George W. Bush’s appointment of a federal judge during an intra-session Senate break. The circuit split virtually guarantees that the Board will ask the Supreme Court to weigh-in. NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce issued a press release within hours of the decision in Canning, announcing that the Board “respectfully disagrees” with the decision, and “believes that the President’s position in the matter will ultimately be upheld.” The Chairman made clear that the NLRB will continue to issue decisions (although it has no power to do so according to the Court in Canning).

The President’s Appointments

On January 4, 2012, the President filled three Board vacancies purportedly by “recess appointment.” The Senate was on a break when the President made the appointments, but was not in formal recess between Senate sessions, when the Senate is unavailable to receive and act upon the President’s nominations of officers. The vacancies filled by the President had occurred in the preceding year-and-a-half, when the Senate was also not in formal recess.

The Constitutional Provisions at Issue

The Appointments Clause provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint…Officers of the United States,” which process includes the appointment of NLRB members. The provision commonly referred to as the “Recess Appointments Clause” adds that, “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their Next Session.”

The Canning Decision

In Noel Canning, 358 NLRB No. 4 (Feb. 8, 2012), the Board had ruled that the employer violated the National Labor Relations Act by failing to draft and execute a collective bargaining agreement that the union alleged the parties had reached during their last bargaining session. On appeal, the employer challenged the NLRB’s decision on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Although the Court of Appeals rejected the employer’s arguments that the Board’s decision was not supported by the evidence and ran afoul of contract law principles, the Court agreed with the employer that the Board lacked the authority to issue its decision in the first place, because only two NLRB members were validly appointed. Absent a quorum of at least three Board members, the Board has no power to act, as the Supreme Court has recently made clear.

The Court’s decision turned on a painstaking analysis of the phrase in the Recess Appointments Clause: “that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.” First, the Court reasoned that “the Recess” referred to in this clause means the time between Senate sessions when the Senate is unavailable to receive and act upon the President’s nominations, as opposed to mere intra-session breaks. The Court emphasized that the framers of the Constitution used the definitive article “the” before the word “Recess,” evidencing that they were contemplating the formal break between Senate sessions, and not merely an “adjournment.” The Court relied upon contemporaneous writings from the time the Constitution was drafted as well, and highlighted that no President even attempted an intra-session appointment for the first 80 years of the country’s existence, further demonstrating that the authors of the Constitution did not intend such appointments. The Court buttressed its interpretation by reasoning that to uphold the appointments in question would effectively eviscerate the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers explicitly found in Appointments Clause’s requirement that the Senate approve presidential nominations. The President could simply bypass Senate approval by waiting for a Senate break to make appointments.

Additionally, the Court determined that the Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the President to fill only those vacancies that actually occur during a formal recess of the Senate. The Court reasoned that a contrary interpretation would render superfluous the Clause’s “that may happen” language. Here, the Court looked to contemporaneous writings from the time the Constitution was written that used the word “happen,” including dictionaries that explain the word “happen” requires an action. The Court also noted there is evidence that the nation’s founders interpreted the word “happen” to mean “arise,” including George Washington in his interpretation of the Senate Vacancies Clause. Here, too, the Court noted that, absent its interpretation, the President could delay making appointments until the Senate went into formal recess, thereby avoiding the need for Senate approval and skirting the separation of powers contemplated by the Appointments Clause.

Now What?

As noted, the Board most likely will seek Supreme Court review of the Canning decision. And, based upon the NLRB’s press release, the Board will continue acting on the assumption that the Supreme Court will uphold the appointments at issue. But, should the Supreme Court affirm the Canning decision, hundreds of Board decisions may be invalidated. This, of course, will not be anything new for the Board recently, which has been down this road once before. In 2010, the Supreme Court invalidated hundreds of Board decisions that were rendered by only two Board members. The Board had to re-decide many cases, creating a backlog that took well over a year to clean up.

For now, however, it may be an employer’s best bet to adhere to the Board’s recent rulings pending future developments in the Supreme Court. Please feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department for answers to questions regarding a case pending before the Board, a decision the NLRB issued against your company this past year, or to help you navigate your options in light of the Canning decision.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB ALJ Strikes (Employer Policies) Again!

In a recent decision, a NLRB administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) found three policies in the Dish Network’s nationally-distributed handbook unlawful: a social media policy, a policy that restricts contact with the media, and a policy that restricts contact with government agencies. While the challenge to the social media policy is nothing new, the decision serves as a reminder for union and non-union employers alike that no policy is safe from scrutiny by the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”).

Following recent Board guidance, the judge initially found the social media policy unlawful for two reasons: first, it banned "disparaging or defamatory comments about DISH Network," which the ALJ concluded could interfere with employee rights to engage in protected concerted activity, such as making collective complaints about terms and conditions of employment; and second, it banned employees from communicating electronically during "Company time," which the judge concluded was unlawful because "Company time" did not clearly exclude breaks and other non-working hours.

The ALJ then critiqued the other two policies with similar scrutiny.

The Contact with the Media Policy read:

The Corporate Communications Department is responsible for any disclosure of information, to the media regarding DISH Network . . . . Unless you receive prior authorization . . . you must direct inquiries to the Corporate Communications Department. Similarly, you have the obligation to obtain the written authorization of the Corporate Communications Department before engaging in public communications regarding DISH Network or its business activities. . . .

The judge decided that the policy was unlawful because it required employees to obtain authorization before speaking about the employer to the media or at public meetings, which, the judge found, “unduly interfere[s]” with workers’ rights to seek outside assistance to improve workplace conditions and terms of employment.

The Contact with Government Agencies Policy stated:

  • Phone calls or letters from government agencies may occasionally be received . . . . The General Counsel must be notified . . . of any communication . . . concerning the Company . . . .
  • If written correspondence is received, notify your manager immediately and forward the correspondence to the General Counsel . . . . The correspondence should not be responded to unless directed [to do so] . . . .
  • If phone contact is made . . . [p]rovide the individual with the General Counsel’s name and number . . . if requested, but do not engage in any further discussion . . . .
  • Immediately . . . notify a supervisor . . . .

The ALJ opined that this policy also was unlawful because workers could construe it as a ban on communications between NLRB agents and workers – thereby interfering with union activity.

Employers throughout the country have workplace policies similar to the Contact with the Media and Government Agencies policies at issue in this case. In light of this new ruling, and recent Board trends, employers conducting periodic review of their employee handbooks and other workplace policies should carefully review policies that could be misconstrued as restrictions upon employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act, and consider tailoring them accordingly.

For answers to questions regarding employers and their workplace policies, please feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB Weighs in on Permissible "At-Will" Employment Language

In light of recent guidance by the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”), non-union employers should review the “at-will” language found in their handbooks (and many standalone policies) to make sure it does not constitute an unlawful waiver of an employee’s right to engage in union activity.

By now, it should come as no surprise that the Board has an interest in non-union workplaces. From promoting a mandatory workplace posting requirement to challenging seemingly innocuous social media policies, the Board should be on the radar screen for all employers. Most recently, the Board has weighed in on at-will disclaimers found in most handbooks or manuals. Such disclaimers typically explain that the employment relationship is not a contractual one, and the employer or employee can end employment at any time for any reason so long as that reason is not unlawful.

Earlier this year, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in an unfair labor practice case found the following at-will acknowledgement unlawful: “I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way.” The ALJ decided the statement would lead employees to believe they could not unionize, thereby, “chilling” their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”). The case settled before the Board had an opportunity to address this language.

The Board’s Division of Advice (which provides guidance to the various Regional offices throughout the United States that take in unfair labor practice charges) recently issued memoranda that found two at-will clauses lawful. The first clause stated that the at-will relationship only could be changed by the employer’s president, and the other clause said that no representative of the employer could enter into an agreement contrary to the at-will relationship. The Division of Advice explained that the first provision acknowledged that the company president could change the at-will relationship, and the second provision did not prohibit an employee from trying to change the at-will relationship. It distinguished the ALJ’s decision noted above by emphasizing that the language in that case involved an acknowledgment that used the personal pronoun, “I,” which the Division of Advice interpreted as an unlawful waiver of an employee’s right to engage in union activity. The Division of Advice has instructed the Regional offices to direct unfair labor practice charges involving at-will language to it. For now, employers may be best suited not to dot their “I’s,” but to delete them.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Court Applies the Brakes to "Quickie" Election Rules

As previously discussed on the Employment Law Alert, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”) recently implemented a rule that could speed up the union election process and, in turn, leave employers with less time to communicate their positions on unions to employees. Yesterday, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declared the rule invalid because only two Board members were “present” when the NLRB passed the rule last December. The Court explained that the Board did not satisfy the National Labor Relations Act’s requirement that the NLRB have a quorum (typically the presence of three Board members) to conduct business when it voted on the rule. “According to Woody Allen, eight percent of life is just showing up,” wrote the Court. “When it comes to satisfying a quorum requirement, though, showing up is even more important than that.”

The Board was comprised of three members when it voted on the final rule, but one of the three Board members, Brian Hayes, took no action whatsoever regarding the adoption of the final rule. The Court noted that Member Hayes merely received electronic notification that the final rule had been circulated for a vote. It did not find his earlier votes against prior versions of the rule and a vote regarding a procedural issue surrounding the final rule sufficient to constitute his presence at the vote on the final rule.

Significantly, the Court did not opine on the legality of the substance of the rule. We must wait to see whether the current Board will try to adopt the rule, and, if so, whether the rule will survive additional legal challenges. In addition to challenges to the rule’s substance, business groups may challenge the current Board's authority to adopt the rule in the first place. On January 4, 2012, President Obama appointed three new members to the Board as "recess" appointments, but it is not clear that the Senate actually was on recess at the time. There, of course, remains the possibility that the Board will appeal the Court’s ruling as well. We will keep you posted.


*****

Employers potentially subject to union organizing should speak with a lawyer in Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department about measures they can take to insulate themselves from unionization, and minimize the chances that their workers look outside their organizations to resolve workplace issues.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

"Quickie" Election Procedures Take Effect Today

On December 22, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”) issued another “union-friendly” rule that could speed up the union election process, leaving employers with limited time to respond to a union organizing drive. A pending lawsuit challenging the legality of the new rule is outstanding. Notwithstanding, the rule applies to all newly-filed election petitions effective today as the court has not postponed the rule’s effective date despite the ongoing litigation. The court will rule on the legitimacy of the rule by May 15 (before an election could take place under the new rule).

Initial Hearing to Take Place a Week or Two After a Petition’s Filing

A memorandum recently issued by the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel directs the Regional Offices to hold an initial hearing within five working days of a petition’s filing. The Regions may grant adjournments, but the hearing must take place no later than 14 days after the petition’s filing absent extraordinary circumstances. In short, a pre-election hearing almost always will take place a week or two after a petition is filed.

Pre-Election Hearings Limited to Questions Concerning Representation

In an attempt to hasten the pre-election process, the new rule limits pre-election hearings to questions concerning representation. This includes questions regarding limited issues, such as election bars, jurisdictional questions, unit eligibility formulas, unit scope determinations and whether a petitioned-for unit is appropriate. This generally will not include questions concerning the voting eligibility of individual workers, which formerly were “fair game” for the pre-election hearing. An election usually will be held before questions about the eligibility of individual workers are addressed.

Pre-Election Appeals to the Board Extremely Limited

Under the new rule, the parties must wait until after the election to appeal pre-election determinations to the Board absent special permission. Special permission is limited to extraordinary circumstances when it appears the determination at issue would evade review unless addressed pre-election. Previously, a party could file a pre-election request for review to the Board and another request for review after the election. Additionally, parties now only can appeal a Hearing Officer’s rulings during the pre-election hearing to the Regional Director and only if the Regional Director allows the appeal.

Post-Hearing Briefs Subject to Hearing Officer’s Discretion

Under the new rule, parties can file post-hearing briefs only if the Hearing Officer allows them to do so. Where Hearing Officers permit briefs, they can limit the scope of the brief and set forth deadlines for the submissions, thereby, further expediting the process.

No More Waiting Period After Direction of Election

An employer has up to seven days after the direction of an election to supply the Regional Director with a list of eligible voters. The union has a right to have this list (referred to as the Excelsior List) for at least 10 days prior to the election. The General Counsel memorandum highlights that the union can waive this right. Accordingly, the Regional Director can schedule the election less than 10 days after deciding to hold the election because the new rule eliminates a previous recommendation that the Regional Director schedule an election no sooner than 25 days after directing an election.

Limited Ability to Challenge Votes at Post-Election Hearing

Post-election hearings to address ballot challenges and objections are more limited now. For instance, the General Counsel memorandum explains that the Regional Director may schedule a hearing only if the objecting party offers evidence that could overturn the election, or that raises material and substantial issues about a voter’s eligibility. Additionally, the Regional Director, not the Board, will decide all exceptions to a Hearing Officer’s post-election report. (However, the Board still could grant a request for review of the Regional Director’s decision on the exceptions.)

* * * * *

Employers potentially subject to union organizing should speak with a lawyer in Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department about implementing a contingency plan that would enable them to effectively respond to an organizing campaign in light of the new rule, which may require them to act very swiftly if they want to provide their workers with the facts about unions prior to an election. We will update you regarding the court’s upcoming decision about the rule’s legality.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB Postpones Effective Date of Workplace Posting Requirement - Again

We previously reported that the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or “NLRB”) issued a final rule requiring most private sector employers to post a notice of employee rights to unionize in their workplaces. In a follow-up report, we explained that the Board delayed the posting’s effective date from November 14, 2011 until January 31, 2012 in the wake of lawsuits filed by business and industry organizations (including the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Federation of Independent Business) challenging the NLRB’s authority to issue such a rule. The Board recently announced that it once again is postponing the effective date of the posting -- this time until April 30, 2012 -- in order to “facilitate the resolution of the legal challenges that have been filed with respect to the rule.” We continue to encourage employers to take advantage of this additional time to assess the potential impact that the required posting may have on their workplaces and the manner in which they may want to communicate with employees regarding their positions on unions (if any). Attorneys in Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department have extensive experience counseling both union and non-union employers regarding labor relations issues. If you have any questions regarding the impact that this rule may have on your business, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Department.

NLRB Postpones Effective Date of Workplace Posting Requirement

As previously reported in the Employment Law Alert, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or “NLRB”) recently issued a final rule requiring most private-sector employers to post a notice of employee rights to unionize in their workplaces. On October 5, 2011, the Board announced that it is delaying the posting’s effective date from November 14, 2011 until January 31, 2012 “in order to allow for enhanced education and outreach to employers, particularly those who operate small and medium sized businesses.”

The postponement comes in the wake of lawsuits filed by business and industry organizations, including the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”) and the National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”), challenging the NLRB’s authority to issue such a rule. (The lawsuits filed by NAM and NFIB have been consolidated). These pending suits may have contributed to the Board’s decision to delay the posting requirement.

Employers should take advantage of this additional time before the rule becomes effective to assess the potential impact of the required posting on their workplaces, and the manner in which they may want to communicate with employees regarding their positions on unions (if any). As we have previously discussed, the notice does not cover certain key aspects of the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act”) of which employees should be aware in order to make an informed decision about whether to vote for unionization. For example, the notice fails to mention that neither a union nor an employer are required to make a single concession during the collective bargaining process. Consequently, employees reading the notice may not understand that their decision to elect a union does not guarantee that their employment will be governed by a collective bargaining agreement. Employers may want to address issues such as this with employees through a supplemental notice or training of front-line supervisors on how to lawfully and effectively address questions employees may have about unions.

Attorneys in Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department have extensive experience counseling both union and non-union employers regarding labor relations issues. If you have any questions regarding the impact that this rule may have on your business, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Private-Sector Employers Required to Post NLRB Notice About Employee Rights to Unionize

The National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or “NLRB”) recently issued a final rule requiring most private-sector employers to post a notice of employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act” or “NLRA”) in their workplaces. (Chapter 1 of the Board’s An Outline of Law and Procedure in Representation Cases details which employers fall within the Act’s jurisdiction.) Business and industry associations, including the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Federation of Independent Business have filed suits challenging the Board’s authority to issue such a rule. Absent a decision by the courts that, in the words of NLRB Member Brian Hayes -- who issued a dissent to the rule (starting at page 54037) -- would “rescue the Board from itself and restore the law to where it was before the sorcerer’s apprentice sent it askew,” employers must post the notice by November 14, 2011.

Most employers already are required to post notices regarding other workplace laws in a readily visible location, and federal contractors presently must conspicuously post a notice substantially similar to the one at hand. The new posting must appear alongside these and other notices concerning personnel rules or policies. For example, employers who customarily post personnel rules and policies on internet or intranet sites must post the notice on such sites in addition to physically posting the notice. Moreover, where at least 20% of an employer’s workforce is comprised of employees who are not proficient in English and speak another language, the employer must post the notice in that other language too (so long as the NLRB translates the notice in that language).

The potential penalties for failing to post the notice can prove significant. First, the very failure to post can, by itself, constitute an unfair labor practice according to the rule. Additionally, the Board may extend the Act’s six-month limitation period for the filing of any other unfair labor practice charge against an employer who fails to post, even if the failure to post has nothing whatsoever to do with that charge. Furthermore, a knowing and willful failure to post may be used as evidence of unlawful motive by the employer regarding any such charge.

Notably, the rule stems from the NLRB’s belief “that many employees protected by the Act are unaware of their rights under the statute and that the rule will increase knowledge of the NLRA among employees, in order to better enable the exercise of rights under the statute.” Yet key aspects of the NLRA that would enable employees to fully understand their rights are missing from the notice.

For instance, the notice states, “[i]f you and your co-workers select a union to act as your collective bargaining representative, your employer and the union are required to bargain in good faith in a genuine effort to reach a written, binding agreement setting your terms and conditions of employment.” The notice fails to mention that “such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession,” as stated at section 8(d) of the Act. Accordingly, employees reading the notice may not understand that the Act provides no guarantee that a collective bargaining agreement will be reached during negotiations, or that it may take months for any such contract to come to fruition. Additionally, the posting may lead to a host of union-related questions by employees reading it.

Significantly, nothing in the rule strips employers of their rights under section 8(c) to express their “views, argument or opinion” on unions. Accordingly, employers may draft a notice of their own to supplement the required posting that clearly and lawfully states their positions on unions, and clarifies employee rights under the Act. Employers also should consider training their front-line supervisors on how to lawfully and effectively address any questions employees may have about unions in light of the notice.

Attorneys in Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department have extensive experience counseling both union and non-union employers regarding labor relations issues. If you have any questions regarding the impact that this rule may have on your business, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB and U.S. DOL Propose New Rules Affecting Union Representation Elections and Persuader Reporting

On June 22, 2011, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) published proposed rule changes in the Federal Register, which, if enacted, will dramatically accelerate the timeframes for union representation elections. One day earlier, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards (“DOL”) published proposed rules to narrow the interpretation of the term “advice” as it pertains to the persuader reporting requirements set forth within Section 203 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Together, these proposed changes create new burdens for employers who wish to communicate with employees about collective bargaining and workplace unionization. If enacted, the practical result of these proposed changes (whether intended or not) is that they will create tactical advantages for organized labor that will in turn help unions win an increased number of representation elections.

The NLRB Proposes “Quickie” Elections

Under current NLRB practice and procedure, employers typically have several weeks between the date that a petition for an election is filed and the actual date of the union representation election. Employers will often use this period to communicate with their employees and, in accordance with certain restrictions, campaign in opposition to the union. The NLRB’s proposed rules, however, seek to streamline the NLRB election process and in effect shorten the amount of time for employers to mount such an opposition campaign. Under the NLRB’s proposal, elections that once took weeks could now be held within 10 days.

In a strongly worded dissent, Brian Hayes, a member of the NLRB, objected to the proposed rule changes, noting that employers will not be provided with sufficient time to communicate their position on unionization and collective bargaining. Specifically, Member Hayes stated:

What is certain is that the proposed rules will (1) substantially shorten the time between the filing of the petition and the election date, and (2) substantially limit the opportunity for full evidentiary hearing or [NLRB] review on contested issues involving, among other things, appropriate unit, voter eligibility, and election misconduct. Thus, by administrative fiat in lieu of Congressional action, the [NLRB] will impose organized labor’s much sought-after ‘quickie election’ option, a procedure under which an election will be held in 10 to 21 days from the filing of the petition. Make no mistake, the principal purpose for this radical manipulation of our election process is to minimize, or rather, to effectively eviscerate an employer’s legitimate opportunity to express its view about collective bargaining.

In total, the NLRB has proposed a significant number of changes to its rules concerning representation. For purposes of clarity and convenience, we have summarized the most significant changes and contrasted them with the current rule in the below table:

Current Procedures
Proposed Procedures
Petitions for NLRB elections and other election-related documents cannot be filed electronically. Rather than by mail or personal delivery, election petitions, election notices, and voter lists may be transmitted electronically.
The amount of time for a pre-election hearing varies by NLRB Regional Office. Pre-election hearings will be held within 7 days of the filing of an election petition with the NLRB (absent special circumstances).
No requirement for the parties to identify issues in dispute prior to the pre-election hearing. The employer must serve a “statement of position” prior to the start of the pre-election hearing.

The statement of position would include the employer’s position on disputed topics (e.g., the NLRB’s jurisdiction, appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought; and the type, date, and location of the union representation election).
A list of voters is not produced until after the Regional Director has directed an election. The party not seeking the election (usually the employer) will be required to file and serve a “preliminary list of voters” which includes names, work location, shift, and classification by the start of the pre-election hearing.
Parties can challenge voter-eligibility issues at the pre-election hearing. Litigation of eligibility issues raised by the parties that involve less than 20% of the bargaining unit would be deferred until after the election.
The parties may request the NLRB review the Regional Director’s pre-election rulings before the election, and waive their rights to seek review if they do not do so. Elections are routinely delayed 25-30 days in order to allow the parties to seek NLRB review. The parties would be permitted to seek review of the Regional Director’s rulings through a single post-election request.
The NLRB itself is required to decide most post-election disputes. The NLRB would now have discretion to deny review of post-election disputes.
The final voter list (also known as the “Excelsior List”), which contains names and home addresses, must be provided within seven days after the direction of an election. The final voter list (“Excelsior List”) would now be provided within two workdays of the direction of an election. The list will also be expanded to include phone numbers and email addresses (where available).

 

The U.S. DOL Seeks To Increase Persuader Reporting

In addition to the changes proposed by the NLRB, the DOL has proposed changes to its interpretation of the persuader reporting requirements set forth in Section 203 of the LMRDA. Section 203 currently requires employers (subject to limited exception) to disclose to the U.S. DOL (via Form LM-10) any arrangement that they have made with a third-party to persuade their employees as to their collective bargaining rights, directly or indirectly, or to obtain information about the activities of a labor organization involved in a labor dispute with the employer.

However, Section 203(c) of the LMRDA provides an exception to the reporting requirement for “advice” given to the employer. In the past, the U.S. DOL has construed this exception broadly to exclude agreements or arrangements where the consultant does not have any direct contact with employees. Accordingly, if a consultant or lawyer were to draft or review communications (e.g., documents, letters, speeches) presented to employees during an organizing drive or in anticipation of an NLRB election, such conduct was deemed “advice,” and therefore there was no need to inform the DOL.

However, should the DOL’s proposal become effective, the term “advice” shall be limited to “oral or written recommendation regarding a decision or course of conduct.” On the other hand “persuader activity” shall include a consultant providing material or communications to, or engaging in other actions, conduct, or communications on behalf of an employer that, in whole or in part, have the object (directly or indirectly) to persuade employees concerning their right to organize and bargain collectively. All agreements for persuader activities would need to be reported, even if a consultant/lawyer did not have direct contact with employees.

Accordingly, if lawyers or consultants draft, review, or analyze employee communications, or are otherwise involved in a campaign in opposition to a union’s organizing or collective bargaining efforts, such actions may now trigger the reporting requirements under Section 203. Moreover, these consultants and lawyers will also likely be required to file their own disclosures with the U.S. DOL (via revised Forms LM-20 and LM-21). Form LM-21 is particularly problematic as it requires disclosure of receipts for all labor relations advice or services provided to all employers during the year (regardless of when that advice is related to persuader activity). The primary effect of these disclosure requirements is to obfuscate employers in their efforts to seek advice in connection with a union organizing drive or election.

The NLRB and DOL proposals are not yet effective. In both instances, the agencies have asked for public comments on the proposals within 60 days of publication. The attorneys in the Gibbons Employment Law Department will be following these developments closely and will update the Employment Law Alert when new information becomes available. If you have any questions regarding the rule changes proposed by the NLRB and the DOL, or the impact that these changes may have on your business, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Gibbons Employment Law Department.


Peter J. Dugan is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment Law Department.