Gov. Christie Issues Conditional Veto of Social Networking Privacy Bill

On Monday, May 5, 2013, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie issued a conditional veto of Assembly Bill No. 2878, the controversial piece of proposed legislation that sought to bar most employers from requiring current or prospective employees to provide user names or passwords to social networking accounts and from inquiring as to whether current or prospective employees even had social networking accounts.

In his veto message, Governor Christie recognized the importance of protecting the privacy of job candidates and employees at the heart of the “well-intentioned” bill, but noted that such privacy concerns “must be balanced against an employer’s need to hire appropriate personnel, manage its operations, and safeguard its business assets and proprietary information.”

Accordingly, Governor Christie recommended several amendments to the bill. First, the conditional veto deleted the entire section of the bill prohibiting employers from requiring or requesting that an employee or prospective employee disclose whether he or she has a social networking account. The conditional veto also struck the section of the bill providing a private right of action to aggrieved employees and prospective candidates against employers. In an apparent effort to offer more protections to employers, the conditional veto added language granting employers the right to conduct investigations to ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations or “prohibitions against work-related misconduct” based on specific information on an employee’s personal account and also the right to investigate employee’s actions regarding the transfer of certain proprietary information to an employee’s personal account. Finally, the conditional veto granted employers the right to view, access or utilize information about current or prospective employees that can be obtained in the public domain.

Notably, the conditional veto did not alter the section of the bill prohibiting an employer from requiring or requesting current or prospective employees to provide user names or passwords to their social networking accounts.

Now the Assembly must vote on the bill incorporating Gov. Christie’s recommended amendments. With the high level of bipartisan support the bill has garnered, as evidenced by its passage in the Senate (38-0) and in the Assembly (75-2), it is likely the vote will happen sooner rather than later.


Lindsay J. Jarusiewicz is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Employee's Facebook Posting Sinks Her FMLA Discrimination and Retaliation Claims

A Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) plaintiff’s leave was proven fraudulent through her Facebook postings, resulting in summary judgment for her employer, dismissing her complaint. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that the employer’s reason for her termination was legitimate and unrelated to her exercise of FMLA rights.

In Lineberry v. Richards, Plaintiff took a leave of absence based on excruciating pain she experienced in her lower back as certified by her physician. She applied for, and received approval from her employer to take, leave under the FMLA. During her leave, she went on vacation to Mexico. Plaintiff later posted on Facebook pictures of her vacation, including photographs showing her riding in a motorboat, lying on her side on a bed holding two bottles of beer in one hand, and holding her infant grandchildren, one in each arm, as she stood. She also posted details regarding certain activities she engaged in during her leave, including trips to Home Depot, watching her grandchildren and taking online classes. After Plaintiff’s co-workers revealed the Facebook postings to their employer, the employer questioned her in an investigation. The employer concluded that Plaintiff lied during the investigation about her use of a wheelchair while on leave.

Plaintiff sued her employer claiming its decision to terminate her employment interfered with her FMLA rights and retaliated against her for taking leave. On summary judgment, the Court reasoned that an employer’s interference with an employee’s FMLA rights does not violate the FMLA if it was motivated by a legitimate reason unrelated to the exercise of FMLA rights. In addition, the FMLA does not provide greater rights to an FMLA-eligible employee than to a non-FMLA-eligible employee. Here, Plaintiff was dishonest, and the employer terminated her employment after it uncovered the dishonesty. Accordingly, Plaintiff was not insulated from termination simply because she was on an FMLA-approved leave at the time.

This case is just another example of social media pervading the workplace and its utility in presenting the facts. It is noteworthy that the Court did not question the appropriateness of the disclosure of plaintiff’s Facebook postings to the employer by plaintiff’s co-workers, which led to plaintiff’s discharge. In a case where an employer is provided with social media postings – rather than surreptitiously obtaining them without authorized access – they may be used for employment decision-making.

For answers to questions regarding employer use of employee social media or the FMLA, please feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


Mitchell Boyarsky is a Director in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRA Impact on Non-Union Workplace Policies to Continue into 2013

At the Gibbons Second Annual Employment & Labor Law Conference last week, one panel discussion addressed the National Labor Relation Board’s (“NLRB”) recent activity, and offered a list of topics to watch in 2013. This blog post contains the highlights from that discussion as related to employer policies.

Of prime interest in our predictions for 2013 is the “recess appointment” issue. Just three weeks ago, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Canning v. NLRB, No. 12-1115 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013) held that three 2012 recess appointments of officers to the NLRB by President Obama were unconstitutional because they lacked the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate and were not authorized by the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause. As a result, the Court vacated the underlying Board decision, finding that the NLRB lacked the quorum necessary for it to take action. The Court’s decision could be viewed as invalidating hundreds of opinions rendered by the Board in 2012. But until either the Supreme Court rules on the “recess appointment” issue or other courts begin invalidating specific decisions, the NLRB is taking the position that its decisions are valid and enforceable. As such, employers must continue to scrutinize their policies and police enforcement in the wake of some of the most recent and controversial NLRB rulings.

Most recently, for example, the NLRB has concluded that language regularly found in employment policies unlawfully restrains workers’ rights under Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). By way of background, the NLRA promises employees the “right…to engage in…concerted activities for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection…” and deems it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with such rights. The law encompasses the type of activity employees participate in when they are considering whether to act in concert with regard to terms and conditions of employment such as salary, work hours, and the like. Typically employees share and compare information about wages and workplace conditions, often accompanied by some griping about, and perhaps even disparagement of, their employer. Whether such exchange occur in the vicinity of the water cooler or on social media, the NLRB deems them protected for all workers, not just those in union workplaces, and will target policies that discourage or prohibit such discussions.

Thus, in Costco Wholesale Corporation and United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 371 (Case 34-CA-012421), the Board determined that an electronic posting rule that prohibited employees from making statements that “damage the company” or “damage any person’s reputation” violated the NLRA. Similarly, in Karl Knauz Motions, Inc., d/b/a Knauz BMW and Robert Becker (Case 13-CA-046452) the Board concluded that a rule encouraging “courtesy” in communications with customers or other employees violated the NLRA because it could prohibit statements of protest or criticism by employees. Finally, in Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. and Carlos Ortiz (Case 03-CA-027872), the company enforced its “zero tolerance” policy on bullying and harassment and terminated employees who had engaged in Facebook posts discussing which employees they believed were shirking their responsibility to the employer’s clients. Although the NLRB concluded that the comments posted on Facebook were not harassing or bullying, it further found that the NLRA authorized the employees to engage in the protected activity of defending criticism of their job performance.

But even before these decisions, in May of 2012, the NLRB issued its “Third Report” on social media, in which it discussed as invalid a number of policies impacting employee participation in social media and also included a policy it considered lawful. This Report, when considered with the cases discussed above and the numerous decisions made by Administrative Law judges as well as NLRB General Counsel Advice Memoranda, provides a roadmap for employers; not only should they be wary about enforcing their existing policies, but they should, at a minimum, be reviewing them for possible modifications. To be clear, even if the “recess appointment” issue results in a complete invalidation of the Board’s decisions last year, the Administrative Law decisions and the NLRB General Counsel Advice Memoranda are guidance in themselves. And there is no reason to believe the NLRB, even if it were required to “re-decide” these cases, would not continue down its current path.

For answers to questions regarding employer obligations under the NLRA, any of the NLRB’s recent decisions, or would like assistance in reviewing your policies, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


Kelly Ann Bird is a Director in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Confidentiality and Non-Disparagement Provisions in Employment Agreement Deemed Unlawful by NLRB Judge

Over the past two years, the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”) has attacked various employment policies of union and non-union employers alike, ranging from social media policies to policies that establish protocol for employees to follow when responding to media inquiries. The Board also has been critical of at-will language commonly found in employee handbooks and policies used by employers throughout the country. In light of the Board’s recent actions, some employers—particularly non-union employers that have not historically focused on Board developments—have begun to reassess policy language that has long existed in their handbooks. Due to a recent administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decision, employers should add employment agreements to their list of employment practices to review and Board developments to watch in 2013.

Last week, in Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 28-CA-75857 (N.L.R.B. A.L.J. Jan. 8, 2013), an ALJ upheld a challenge to confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions in an employment agreement distributed by an employer to its workers (mortgage bankers) nationwide. The ALJ concluded that the language “chilled” employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities in violation of the NLRA, despite the employer’s argument that the provisions were necessary to protect its investment in educating and training workers.

Language at Issue

The “Proprietary/Confidential Information” provision in the employment agreement prohibited employees from disclosing, among other things, “non-public information relating to . . . the Company’s business, personnel[,] . . . all personnel lists, [and] personal information of co-workers . . . such as home phone numbers, cell phone numbers, addresses and e-mail addresses” to “any person, business or entity.”

The “Non-Disparagement” section barred employees from publicly criticizing, ridiculing, disparaging, or defaming “the Company, its products, services, [and] policies . . . through any written or oral statement . . . .”

Language Deemed Unlawful

The ALJ opined that there was “no doubt” these provisions violated the NLRA. More specifically, he decided that the confidentiality provision was unlawful because it prohibited employees from discussing “wages and other benefits they receive” as well as “the names, wages, benefits, addresses or telephone numbers of other employees” with fellow employees and union representatives. And, he concluded that the non-disparagement provision also violated the law because “[w]ithin certain limits, employees are allowed to criticize their employer and its products” through appeals to the public and fellow workers.

Takeaway

Many companies, including non-union employers, have handbooks, policies, and employment agreements that contain language similar to that in the confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions at issue in the Quicken Loan case. Employers should consider reviewing these policies and agreements in light of the NLRA’s protections, as recently interpreted by the Board. For answers to questions regarding whether the language in handbooks, policies and employment agreements would withstand scrutiny from the Board, please feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB ALJ Strikes (Employer Policies) Again!

In a recent decision, a NLRB administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) found three policies in the Dish Network’s nationally-distributed handbook unlawful: a social media policy, a policy that restricts contact with the media, and a policy that restricts contact with government agencies. While the challenge to the social media policy is nothing new, the decision serves as a reminder for union and non-union employers alike that no policy is safe from scrutiny by the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board” or the “NLRB”).

Following recent Board guidance, the judge initially found the social media policy unlawful for two reasons: first, it banned "disparaging or defamatory comments about DISH Network," which the ALJ concluded could interfere with employee rights to engage in protected concerted activity, such as making collective complaints about terms and conditions of employment; and second, it banned employees from communicating electronically during "Company time," which the judge concluded was unlawful because "Company time" did not clearly exclude breaks and other non-working hours.

The ALJ then critiqued the other two policies with similar scrutiny.

The Contact with the Media Policy read:

The Corporate Communications Department is responsible for any disclosure of information, to the media regarding DISH Network . . . . Unless you receive prior authorization . . . you must direct inquiries to the Corporate Communications Department. Similarly, you have the obligation to obtain the written authorization of the Corporate Communications Department before engaging in public communications regarding DISH Network or its business activities. . . .

The judge decided that the policy was unlawful because it required employees to obtain authorization before speaking about the employer to the media or at public meetings, which, the judge found, “unduly interfere[s]” with workers’ rights to seek outside assistance to improve workplace conditions and terms of employment.

The Contact with Government Agencies Policy stated:

  • Phone calls or letters from government agencies may occasionally be received . . . . The General Counsel must be notified . . . of any communication . . . concerning the Company . . . .
  • If written correspondence is received, notify your manager immediately and forward the correspondence to the General Counsel . . . . The correspondence should not be responded to unless directed [to do so] . . . .
  • If phone contact is made . . . [p]rovide the individual with the General Counsel’s name and number . . . if requested, but do not engage in any further discussion . . . .
  • Immediately . . . notify a supervisor . . . .

The ALJ opined that this policy also was unlawful because workers could construe it as a ban on communications between NLRB agents and workers – thereby interfering with union activity.

Employers throughout the country have workplace policies similar to the Contact with the Media and Government Agencies policies at issue in this case. In light of this new ruling, and recent Board trends, employers conducting periodic review of their employee handbooks and other workplace policies should carefully review policies that could be misconstrued as restrictions upon employee rights under the National Labor Relations Act, and consider tailoring them accordingly.

For answers to questions regarding employers and their workplace policies, please feel free to contact an attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Time to Review Your Employee Policies and Training Programs

As we near the end of the year, now may be a good time to dust off your employee manual and training programs! An annual review of policies is a good best practice that can save your company both time and money in the long run.

For instance, have you considered revising your policies or offering trainings in areas that have been the focus of recent legal activity such as:

  • social media
  • confidentiality
  • reasonable accommodations, or
  • bullying

Kelly Ann Bird expands on the policies that employers should review today in an article recently published by the Association of Corporate Counsel entitled Employment Policies and Training: Why They Make Sense Now. Click here to read the full article.

NLRB Weighs in on Permissible "At-Will" Employment Language

In light of recent guidance by the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”), non-union employers should review the “at-will” language found in their handbooks (and many standalone policies) to make sure it does not constitute an unlawful waiver of an employee’s right to engage in union activity.

By now, it should come as no surprise that the Board has an interest in non-union workplaces. From promoting a mandatory workplace posting requirement to challenging seemingly innocuous social media policies, the Board should be on the radar screen for all employers. Most recently, the Board has weighed in on at-will disclaimers found in most handbooks or manuals. Such disclaimers typically explain that the employment relationship is not a contractual one, and the employer or employee can end employment at any time for any reason so long as that reason is not unlawful.

Earlier this year, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in an unfair labor practice case found the following at-will acknowledgement unlawful: “I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way.” The ALJ decided the statement would lead employees to believe they could not unionize, thereby, “chilling” their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”). The case settled before the Board had an opportunity to address this language.

The Board’s Division of Advice (which provides guidance to the various Regional offices throughout the United States that take in unfair labor practice charges) recently issued memoranda that found two at-will clauses lawful. The first clause stated that the at-will relationship only could be changed by the employer’s president, and the other clause said that no representative of the employer could enter into an agreement contrary to the at-will relationship. The Division of Advice explained that the first provision acknowledged that the company president could change the at-will relationship, and the second provision did not prohibit an employee from trying to change the at-will relationship. It distinguished the ALJ’s decision noted above by emphasizing that the language in that case involved an acknowledgment that used the personal pronoun, “I,” which the Division of Advice interpreted as an unlawful waiver of an employee’s right to engage in union activity. The Division of Advice has instructed the Regional offices to direct unfair labor practice charges involving at-will language to it. For now, employers may be best suited not to dot their “I’s,” but to delete them.


James J. La Rocca is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Taking Over Former Employee's LinkedIn Account Not a Violation of Federal Law, According to Pennsylvania District Court

A Pennsylvania Federal District Court has decided that an employer did not violate the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) or the Federal Lanham Act, when it took control of a departed employee’s LinkedIn account. The Court ruled that (1) the CFAA, which in part prohibits unauthorized access to a computer with the intent to defraud, did not come into play and (2) no trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act had occurred.

Factual Background

In Eagle v. Moran et al. plaintiff Eagle was employed as the CEO of Edcomm, Inc., a company that provided training services. In accordance with company practice, Eagle set up a LinkedIn account and gave another employee the password to her account. Edcomm followed a policy of asserting “ownership” over the account when an employee departed the Company; it would extract data and incoming information from the LinkedIn account, but took steps to avoid stealing the former employee’s identity. After Eagle’s involuntary termination, Edcomm used her password to change Eagle’s LinkedIn profile to that of the incoming CEO, and it replaced the photographs and information to reflect that of the new employee. Plaintiff claimed that when searches were done for her, the name and photograph of her replacement was displayed, yet Eagle’s awards, recommendations and contacts remained unchanged. In her lawsuit, Plaintiff claimed violations of the CFAA, the Lanham Act and state common law arising from the loss of business opportunities, relationships, reputation and trust caused by the change to her LinkedIn profile.

Court’s Ruling

In order to prove a violation of the CFAA, a federal statute that prohibits unauthorized access and use of computers, a plaintiff must show actual damages. As the Court held, potential loss of future business -- particularly as plaintiff speculatively claimed -- is insufficient. Similarly, a loss to one’s reputation or relationship with clients does not arise to the level of a CFAA violation. The District Court dismissed Eagle’s CFAA claim, finding that Eagle’s simply claiming a loss of business opportunities by her lack of access to and control of her LinkedIn account for four months, failed as a matter of law to establish a CFAA violation. In addition, plaintiff was not claiming a monetary loss because her computer was inoperable or she expended money to repair damage to it (typical of a CFAA claim).

The Court also dismissed Eagle’s claim under the Lanham Act, the federal statute relating to trademark protection which prohibits unfair competition in goods and services through use of a word, term, name, symbol or device (or a combination of them) that is likely to confuse, mislead or deceive regarding the affiliation, sponsorship or approval of such goods, services or commercial activities. A viable claim under the Lanham Act requires a showing of a legally protectible mark, the plaintiff owns the mark and the defendant’s use of the mark to identify goods and services is likely to cause confusion. The Court considered the Third Circuit’s Lapp factors -- a non-exhaustive list of factors used to determine whether the mark is likely to cause confusion -- and concluded that the use of the LinkedIn account by the incoming CEO is unlikely to confuse a viewer. The Court did so reasoning that the account was changed to reflect the name, photograph and information of the incoming CEO. Also, Edcomm made no attempt to portray the new CEO as the former one or to claim the outgoing CEO was affiliated with or endorsed by Edcomm.

Finally, the Court maintained jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims, noting that the trial date was only 2 weeks away and that it would be unfair to dismiss those claims at such a late date.

Conclusion

The law with regard to social media -- especially professional social media -- is constantly evolving. Efforts by an employer to assert protections over company sponsored or directed social media activity is likely to face challenges by employees asserting privacy and property rights. Employers should consider these and other related social media activities when preparing social media policies and enforcement measures. For answers to questions regarding social media issues, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


Mitchell Boyarsky is a Director in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB's Third Social Media Report Includes Model Social Media Policy

On May 30, 2012, the National Labor Relations Board's Acting General Counsel issued a third report on social media cases. This report follows the Board’s August 2011 and January 2012 reports on the subject, which we previously discussed. The guidance contained in the three social media reports is applicable to most private sector employers, unionized or not.

The third report discusses seven social media cases handled by the Board’s General Counsel in recent months, all of them focused on employer policies that restrict employee social media postings or communications. In six of the seven cases, the General Counsel’s office found that some provisions of the employers’ social media policies were unlawfully broad, interfering with the rights of employees under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to engage in “protected concerted activities.”

Significantly, the General Counsel’s office concluded that the entire social media policy in the seventh case was lawful under the NLRA. The third report includes the full text of the lawful policy, providing the most helpful guidance for employers to date regarding what social media policy provisions will pass muster with the Board. In its discussion of the lawful policy, the report stressed that the policy avoided ambiguity regarding its coverage by providing sufficient examples of “plainly egregious conduct” so that employees would not reasonably construe the policy to bar Section 7 activities, such as discussion of wages and working conditions with co-workers.

In light of the NLRB’s most recent social media report and the continuous evolution of social media technology, employers should review their social media policies with employment counsel to ensure that their policy language complies with current law. In particular, employer social media policies should incorporate examples of prohibited conduct to avoid possible confusion about the policy’s coverage and emphasize the legitimate reasons for the policy (for example, preventing the improper disclosure of proprietary information via social media or the use of social media to engage in conduct that violates anti-discrimination and harassment policies).

To discuss your company’s social media policy or other policy needs, please contact any attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.



Kristin D. Sostowski is a Director in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

New Jersey Legislative Update: New Laws Could Limit Employer's Use of Credit Reports and Social Networking Information

If passed into law, two bills currently pending before the New Jersey General Assembly will place significant limitations on the categories of information that New Jersey employers may use and rely upon in connection with the hiring, promotion, and termination of employees.

Credit Reports & Related Information

Bill A2840, introduced in the Assembly on May 10, 2012, proposes legislation that would prohibit an employer from obtaining, requiring or otherwise basing employment decisions, such as hiring, promotion, and discipline on reports containing information about an applicant’s or current employee’s credit history, credit score, credit account balances, payment history, and savings or checking account balances or numbers.

The bill creates exceptions to the above restrictions for: (1) those employers who are required by law to obtain a credit report, or (2) when a credit inquiry is related to a bona fide occupational qualification. The bill provides guidance by stating that credit history may be considered a bona fide occupational qualification if the position in question involves setting the financial direction or control of the business, or otherwise involves access to customers’, employees’, or the employers’ personal belongings, financial assets, or financial information (excluding financial information that is customarily provided in a retail transaction). The bill prohibits employers from compelling employees to waive the protections granted under the bill.

The proposed law authorizes enforcement through private civil suits. The bill also provides for the imposition of civil penalties in an amount not to exceed $2,000 for the first violation, and $5,000 for each subsequent violation, collectible by the Commissioner of Labor of Workforce Development.

Over the past 5 years, seven other states – California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington – have passed similar legislation.

Social Network Information

Bill A278, was recently approved by the Consumer Affairs Committee of the New Jersey Assembly and would prohibit employers from asking a current or prospective employee if he or she has an account or profile on a social networking website (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter). Moreover, the bill would ban employers from requesting that an applicant or current employee disclose his or her username and password for such access. The protections granted under the bill cannot be waived. Private civil suits to enforce the proposed law are permitted if filed within one year from the date of the alleged violation. The Court may, as it deems appropriate, order or award the following: (1) injunctive relief (including reinstatement); (2) compensatory and consequential damages; and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs. Not surprisingly, the bill prohibits retaliation or discrimination against any employees who refuses to disclose his or her username or password or who files a complaint. Moreover, an employer who violates any provision shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $1,000 for the first violation and $2,500 for each subsequent violation, collectible by the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce Development.

The Consumer Affairs Committee also approved a similar bill, A279, which bars higher education institutions from asking applicants or students for the disclosure of social networking website information.

Employer Takeaway

In light of these recent developments, New Jersey employers should review their current handbooks, policies, employment applications and practices and consider whether changes will be necessary if these bills are signed into law. We will, of course, keep our readers up to date on future developments as we monitor the progress of the proposed legislation. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact any of the attorneys in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


Peter J. Dugan is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

NLRB Report on Social Media Cases Provides Guidance for Employers on Social Media Policies

The National Labor Relations Board’s Acting General Counsel recently issued a report and press release summarizing the outcomes of recent NLRB cases involving employees’ use of social media and the legality of employers’ social media policies. Among the cases discussed in the report are several in which the Board found that provisions of employers’ social media policies violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits work rules that would “reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights” to engage in “concerted activities” for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”

Although the NLRB report does not pronounce any new or specific rules for employers to follow in drafting social media policies, it suggests that to avoid running afoul of Section 8(a)(1), social media policies should be narrowly tailored so as not to prohibit “concerted activity” via social media, such as online discussion among coworkers regarding terms and conditions of employment. Employers should be mindful that union and non-union employees alike are covered by the NLRA, and thus the Board’s recent rulings on social media policies are applicable to virtually all employers.

The report specifically discussed Board rulings that the following social media policy provisions were overly broad and violated Section 8(a)(1):

  • Policy prohibiting the use of social media to post pictures depicting the company in any way, such as pictures containing the company uniform or logo.
  • Policy prohibiting employees “making disparaging comments when discussing the company or the employee’s superiors, coworkers, and/or competitors.”
  • Policy barring employee use of social media to engage “in inappropriate discussions about the company, management, and/or coworkers.”
  • Policy that prohibited employees from using social media in a manner that would: (1) “ violate, compromise, or disregard the rights and reasonable expectations as to privacy or confidentiality of any person or entity,” (2) constitute “embarrassment, harassment or defamation of the [employer] or any … employee, officer, board member, representative, or staff member,” or (3) “lack truthfulness or that might damage the reputation or goodwill of the [employer], its staff, or employees.”
  • Policy barring employees from using social media to “talk about company business,” post “anything that they would not want their manager or supervisor to see or that would put their job in jeopardy,” disclose “inappropriate or sensitive information” about the employer, or post “pictures or comments involving the company or its employees that could be construed as inappropriate.”
  • Policies prohibiting employees from using the company’s name, address or other information in their personal online profiles, or from revealing information regarding coworkers, company clients, partners or customers without their consent.

In light of these NLRB rulings, employers should reexamine their social media policies (or consider adopting one), keeping in mind the following best practices.

  • A social media policy should be clear and understandable to the average employee. The NLRB’s rulings have in large part turned on the ambiguities of social media policies, and the possibility that employees may misunderstand the policies to bar protected activities.
  • A social media policy must not be overbroad. Policies should be narrowly drawn to address the employer’s legitimate policy objectives (for example, preventing the disclosure of the company’s proprietary information via social media or restricting the use of social media to engage in harassing conduct that would violate the company’s anti-discrimination and harassment policies).
  • To put employees on notice of a social media policy’s coverage, the policy should include examples of prohibited conduct and/or definitions of terms that could be misconstrued by employees as barring protected activity.
  • A social media policy should include limiting language advising employees that the policy does not apply to activities protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.

In light of the continuous evolution of social media technology and the law in this area, employers should review their social media policies with employment counsel periodically to ensure that the policy language complies with current law and is consistent with the state of technology. To discuss your company’s policy needs, please contact any attorney in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.


Kristin D. Sostowski is a Director in the Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Department.

Pennsylvania Court Orders Plaintiff to Disclose Facebook and MySpace Passwords, User Names, and Log in Names to Defendant

A Pennsylvania trial court recently became one of a growing number of courts to rule that a plaintiff’s non-public Facebook and MySpace postings are discoverable. On May 19, 2011, in Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc., No. CV-09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. Comm. Pl. May 19, 2011) the Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania granted the defendant’s motion to compel the plaintiff, a former employee of the defendant, to disclose his Facebook and MySpace passwords, user names and log in names. Notably, the Court reasoned that because the plaintiff voluntarily posted all of the pictures and information on his Facebook and MySpace sites, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy to the postings although the posts were on non-public pages.

Key to the Zimmerman Court’s decision was the fact that the defendant demonstrated that the public portions of the plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace pages contained postings and pictures directly contrary to the plaintiff’s claim that a work related accident had caused his health to be seriously and permanently impaired. The Court held that: (1) because the plaintiff had put his physical condition at issue, the defendant was entitled to “discovery thereon” and (2) based on a review of the publicly accessible portions of the plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace pages, there was a reasonable likelihood of additionally relevant information on the non-public portions of the social media sites. Specifically, despite the plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he never wore shorts due to his embarrassment of a scar on his leg from the accident, the public portions of his MySpace page contained pictures of the plaintiff in shorts with his scar visible, as well as recent pictures of the plaintiff with his motorcycle. In addition, the public portions of the plaintiff’s Facebook page stated his interests included “ridin” and “bike stunts.”

The Zimmerman Court was careful to warn that its decision should not be construed as authorizing “fishing expeditions” or a carte blanche entitlement to private Facebook and MySpace information in every personal injury case. The Court explained that in order to obtain access to a plaintiff’s private social media postings, a defendant must file a motion that makes a “threshold showing that the publicly accessible portions of any social networking site contain information that would suggest that further relevant postings are likely to be found by access to the non-public portions.” Thus, while courts are allowing the discovery of non-public social media postings with increased frequency, the Zimmerman decision provides an important reminder of the importance of early investigation of a plaintiff’s public social media presence.

Additional discussions on the discoverability of social media postings by members of the Gibbons Employment Law Department and the E-Discovery Task Force can be found here, here and here.


Suzanne Herrmann Brock is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment Law Department.

NLRB "Facebook Firing" Case Ends with Settlement

The highly publicized “Facebook firing” case, brought by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and discussed in a November 12, 2010 post in the Employment Law Alert, ended with a settlement announced on February 7, 2011. According to the Complaint, American Medical Response of Connecticut Inc. (“AMR”) terminated an employee for criticizing her boss on her Facebook account.

As announced by the NLRB in a news release, AMR will “revise its overly broad rules to ensure that they do not improperly restrict employees from discussing their wages, hours and working conditions with co-workers and others while not at work,” and that they “would not discipline or discharge employees for engaging in such discussions.” AMR’s internet policy had prohibited online comments that “berate” and “slander” supervisors.

In addition, the company also promised that “employee requests for union representation will not be denied in the future and that employees will not be threatened with discipline for requesting union representation.” The allegations involving the former employee’s termination were resolved through a separate, private agreement between her and AMR.

Although there was neither a public hearing nor a formal decision by the NLRB, the NLRB’s commencement of the action and settlement announcement reflect its intention to police the degree of control employers seek to assert over employees’ social-media communications. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the 75-year-old law under which the complaint was brought, which restricts employers’ attempts to interfere with or restrict employees’ attempts to improve the “terms and conditions of their workplace and environment,” admittedly contains no provisions relating to such mediums. What remains to be seen is the degree, if any, to which the NLRB, the courts, and/or Congress permit employers to more greatly restrict and control the social-media communications of employees in recognition of the significant quantitative and qualitative differences between electronic posts that are viewed and forwarded almost instantaneously by numerous strangers — possibly millions — worldwide and traditional small-group concerted activities such as face-to-face conversations, picketing, and sit-ins.

In light of this case and the rapidly changing landscape of electronic communications, employers should review their social media policies to ensure that they do not unduly inhibit or restrict their employees’ rights to act in engage in protected activity.


Michael J. Riccobono is an Associate in the Gibbons Employment Law Department.

Employer Social Media Policies: The Dangers of Too Much Or Not Enough

Employers wanting to prohibit damaging communications from being made about them by employees through blogging and rapidly evolving social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn should be aware of a recent National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Complaint against American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. asserting that two of the more common employer restrictions on employee blogging and social media communications constitute unfair labor practices and are, therefore, unlawful. In its News Release, the NLRB pointed to two of the provisions in the company’s blogging and internet posting policies as being unlawful under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA):

  • “one that prohibited employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or supervisors;”
  • “and another that prohibited employees from depicting the company in any way over the internet without company permission.”

This position, which emanates from the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel, seems to differ from a December 2009 Advisory Memorandum from the NLRB General Counsel’s Division of Advice that found lawful the social media policy of Sears, Roebuck and Co. prohibiting, among other things, “[d]isparagement of company’s . . . products, services, executive leadership, employees, strategy, and business products.”

Although a union precipitated the recent Complaint and the individual who was terminated for her Facebook postings was a union member, the NLRB could easily make the same assertions against employers when there is no union involvement, because Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ rights to engage, not only in union-related activity, but also in “other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.” Anecdotally, it seems that far too many non-unionized employers have either been unaware or apt to downplay the significance of this aspect of the NLRA.

Perhaps the resolution of this case will clarify at least some of the many uncertainties regarding the practical effects of Section 7 and other statutes and legal doctrines on employers’ abilities to restrict the social-media activities of employees. Definitive clarity, however, is not likely anytime soon for reasons such as:

  • the rapidly changing nature of electronic communications (who foresaw phenomena like Facebook and Twitter not so long ago?);
  • what allowance, if any, will be made for the quantitative and qualitative differences between electronic posts that are viewed and forwarded almost instantaneously by numerous strangers — possibly millions — worldwide and traditional small-group activities such as face-to-face conversations and picketing; and
  • the effects of political changes on institutions such as the NLRB, within which there appear to be differences of opinion as illustrated by the contrast between the December 2009 Advisory Memorandum and recent Complaint.

This is not to say that the best course is for an employer to view this shifting landscape as an excuse to do nothing to deter individuals it is paying wages (presumably in exchange for expected positive contributions) from biting in a very damaging way the hand that feeds. To the contrary, these developments underscore the dangers not only of drafting and enforcing policies without sufficient attention to Section 7, but also of inaction.

Employee Personal Use of Company-Owned Electronic Devices in the Wake of Stengart and Quon

In this technology age, employees increasingly make personal use of workplace electronic communications applications. The legal ramifications of such personal use – and how employers can create policies that balance the right to monitor the workplace with employees’ expectations of privacy – were examined in an informative panel discussion, “Electronic Communications Policies in the Wake of Stengart and Quon” during Gibbons P.C.’s Fourth Annual E-Discovery Conference on October 28, 2010.

Discussion regarding Stengart

The panel kicked off with a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s March 30, 2010, ruling in Stengart v. Loving Care, which presented novel questions about the extent to which an employee could expect privacy and confidentiality in personal e-mails with her attorney that she accessed on a computer belonging to her employer. The Court held that an employee did not waive the attorney-client privilege when using a company computer to communicate with her attorney via a personal password-protected e-mail account, and that attorneys for the employer who failed to turn over the attorney-client communications found on the computer were subject to sanctions.

A panel member explained that Stengart does not prevent employers from implementing and enforcing unambiguous electronic communications policies or from monitoring employee communications pursuant to such policies. Nor does it prevent employers from imaging and reviewing the contents of an employee’s computer in conjunction with a lawsuit. Employers, however should refrain from reading any communications between an employee and her attorney uncovered as part of such reviews. For further discussion of the Stengart case, see the article co-authored by Richard Zackin and Kristin Sostowski.

Discussion regarding Quon and Nelson

Next, the panel reviewed the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Ontario v. Quon, rendered on June 17, 2010, which examined the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of government employees in their workplace communications. At issue in Quon was whether the Fourth Amendment's ban on “unreasonable searches” puts any limits on searches by public employers. The Court held that a police chief did not violate the constitutional rights of an officer when he read the transcripts of sexually explicit text messages sent from the officer’s work pager. A panel member noted that in so holding, the Court effectively “punted” the constitutional issue by assuming that the police chief's reading of the text messages was a search under the Fourth Amendment, but holding that the search was sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster.

The panel also noted that the case of NASA v. Nelson, which was argued before the United States Supreme Court on October 5, 2010, represents a new opportunity for the Court to make a broader statement regarding privacy rights. Nelson involves the constitutional right of employees of federal contractors to keep private personal information in conjunction with background checks.

Practical Pointers for Employers Offered

In light of the recent case law regarding employee privacy, the panel then provided practical points as to how employers can craft and execute a reasonable and enforceable electronic communications policy. The panel stressed that the best policies are clear to the intended audience and unequivocally state the employer’s position with respect to an employee’s expectation of privacy in their electronic communications. Training employees and requiring them to sign annual acknowledgements are important in this regard. Additional tips for employers on how to formulate a clear and understandable electronic systems policy are included in an April 2010 New Jersey Law Journal article authored by Kristin Sostowski.

The panel also discussed the importance of having proper monitoring mechanisms and protocols in place, such as reviewing employees’ emails, tracking the time spent by employees on personal websites, and blocking access to certain websites, password-protected email accounts and social networking sites like Facebook.

Finally, the panel addressed issues that companies – particularly national and multinational companies or those who store their data off-site – may have to confront regarding privacy protections found in the federal Stored Communications Act, which prohibits the unauthorized access of stored communications such as e-mail and Internet accounts. The panel also noted the existence of broader privacy protections afforded by the European Union Privacy Directive and other similar international protocols.

The panel fielded a wide range of questions regarding the content of electronic communications policies and the types of monitoring permitted. With regard to content, the panel noted that a policy permitting limited personal use but clearly spelling out an employer’s right to access workplace information, supported by proper monitoring, is usually the most realistic and enforceable approach.


This post is also featured on Gibbons E-Discovery Law Alert.