Author: Christopher Walsh

NJ Appellate Division Holds That Residency of Party Making First Contact in Long-Term Business Relationship Is Not “Jurisdictionally Dispositive”

Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant cannot be based on the unilateral acts of an in-state plaintiff. Instead, a New Jersey court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant only if that defendant “reached out” to New Jersey in some meaningful way. Consequently, when an out-of-state defendant is sued by an in-state plaintiff alleging a breach of contract, the court will often look to see which party initiated the contractual relationship when deciding whether it has jurisdiction over the defendant. In a recent published opinion, however, the New Jersey Appellate Division clarified that, depending on the particular facts of a matter, jurisdiction may be asserted over an out-of-state defendant even when an in-state plaintiff initiated the relationship. In Allure Pet Products, LLC v. Donnelly Marketing & Development LLC , the plaintiff, a New Jersey-based supplier of pet products, telephoned the defendant, a Utah-based organizer of trade shows, in 2011 to request booth space for a biennial trade show planned for 2012. The agreement was consummated, and the plaintiff exhibited at the 2012 trade show. In 2013, the defendant mailed to the plaintiff a “special offer” to renew its booth space for the 2014 show. The plaintiff accepted the offer and exhibited at the 2014 show. The same pattern held for the 2016 and 2018 shows: The...

Third Circuit Permits Extra-Strong Restrictive Covenants for Extra-Good Employees

In a recent “precedential” opinion, the Third Circuit, applying New Jersey law, approved an employer’s use of an additional, extra-stringent restrictive covenant for its high-performing salespeople, subject to careful blue lining by the court to ensure that the covenant does not create an unreasonable burden for the employees. ADP, LLC, the well-known provider of payroll and other human resources services, required its new sales employees, as a condition of employment, to sign a Sales Representative Agreement and a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Together, the two agreements essentially prohibited the employee, for one year after the termination of employment, from soliciting ADP customers “with which the Employee was involved or exposed” while employed at ADP. Once employed, ADP’s sales staff could earn stock awards by meeting certain sales targets. But to receive an award, the employee had to sign a third agreement, a Restrictive Covenant Agreement, which imposed still more post-employment restrictions on the employee. Among other things, the Restrictive Covenant Agreement essentially prohibited the employee for two years after termination from soliciting all current and prospective ADP customers, whether or not the employee was “involved or exposed” to the customer while employed by ADP. The Restrictive Covenant Agreement also contained a geographic restriction, which essentially prohibited the employee from competing against ADP in the same geographic area...

Third Circuit Considers Whether Employer May Access Employee’s Password-Protected Information from Work Computer

In a recent “Not Precedential” opinion, a divided Third Circuit panel engaged in an instructive and interesting debate about whether, under New Jersey law, an employer may access and monitor a former employee’s password-protected accounts using information the employee left on his work computer. The case involved a group of employees who left an employer en masse to join a competing enterprise. One of the departing employees failed to log out of his Facebook account before he returned his computer to the employer. The employer was thus able to—and did—monitor for more than a month the employee’s password-protected Facebook activity, which included Facebook Messenger exchanges among the other former employees in which the employees admitted to improperly sending the employer’s confidential information to their new employer. When the employer sought a preliminary injunction against the former employees, the employees claimed that the old employer had unclean hands—and thus was not entitled to an injunction—because of its post-termination monitoring of the employee’s password-protected Facebook activity and other password-protected accounts. The district court rejected the unclean hands defense and entered an injunction. On appeal the majority held that the employer’s monitoring of the employee’s accounts was not sufficiently related to the employees’ wrongful conduct to support an unclean hands defense. But the majority did not stop there....

Delaware Supreme Court Orders Production of Emails in Response to Section 220 Demand and Refuses to Restrict Knock-On Litigation to Delaware

In KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Technologies Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court required a corporation to produce emails in response to a “books and records” demand under 8 Del. C. §220; it also refused to limit any knock-on litigation on the merits to the Delaware Court of Chancery. KT4 is a stockholder in Palantir and received certain rights under a series of Investor Rights Agreements and a First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement. After a falling out between KT4 and Palantir’s management, Palantir amended the Investor Rights Agreement in ways detrimental to KT4. KT4 responded with a request to inspect Palantir’s “books and records” pursuant to 8 Del. C. §220, which entitles a stockholder to inspect a corporation’s “books and records” if, and to the extent that, the requested inspection “is for a proper purpose.” Palantir refused to comply, and KT4 filed a §220 action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel production of the requested documents. The Court of Chancery ruled that KT4 had a statutory “proper purpose” of investigating three areas of potential corporate wrongdoing: 1) Palantir’s failure to hold stockholder meetings, 2) Palantir’s amendment of the Investor Rights Agreement, and 3) Palantir’s potential breach of the Investor Rights and Co-Sale Agreements. The Court of Chancery further held that KT4 was “entitled to...

New Jersey Chancery Division Adopts Watered-Down Trulia Standard and Approves Disclosure-Only Settlement of Merger Litigation

Nearly three years ago, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its landmark opinion in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, in which Chancellor Bouchard strongly criticized the use of disclosure-only settlements in class-action merger challenges and subjected such settlements to a heightened level of judicial review. In a disclosure-only settlement the merging parties agree to enhance their disclosures about the challenged merger in exchange for a broad release from a settlement class comprised of their shareholders. According to Chancellor Bouchard, all too often the enhanced disclosures in such settlements provide little, if any, value to the shareholders, while class counsel get large fee awards and the corporations get “deal insurance” because their shareholders have released them and their boards from liability arising from the transaction. Because disclosure-only settlements so rarely give meaningful relief to the shareholders, Chancellor Bouchard held that a court should approve them only if “the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission[] and the subject matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed.” In the first published New Jersey state court opinion addressing the Trulia standard, the Chancery Division in Strougo v. Ocean Shore Holding Co. followed Trulia in holding that disclosure-only settlements are to be subject to “more exacting scrutiny,” but it is doubtful that the Chancery Division scrutinized the...

New Jersey Federal Court Holds that Cryptocurrency Allegations Sufficiently Alleged a “Security” Subject to ’33 Act Registration Requirements

In Solis v. Latium Network, Inc., Susan D. Wigenton, a United States District Judge in the District of New Jersey, held that a class action plaintiff adequately alleged that a particular cryptocurrency was a “security” subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and, by extension, the regulatory strictures of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Solis alleged that Latium operates a blockchain-based, crowdsource tasking platform, which allows users to create tasks, find people to complete the tasks, and then verify completion of the tasks according to specified standards. Users of the platform pay for the completed tasks using Latium X tokens, Latium’s proprietary cryptocurrency, which can be used only on Latium’s platform. Solis also alleged that, to raise money for the platform, Latium offered its tokens for sale to the public in exchange for U.S. dollars or the cryptocurrency Ether. The sale was conducted in several stages, with the cost of a token increasing with each successive stage. When marketing the tokens, Latium stressed the limited quantity of tokens to be issued and characterized its tasking platform, particularly in tandem with the tokens, as a “unique investment opportunity.” Solis purchased $25,000 in Latium X tokens and later sued Latium in a class action, alleging that the Latium X tokens are “securities”—specifically...

New Jersey Supreme Court Approves Special Rules for Matters in the Complex Business Litigation Program

On January 1, 2015, the New Jersey Superior Court implemented statewide the Complex Business Litigation Program (“CBLP”) for complex commercial and construction cases with amounts in controversy exceeding $200,000. Each case in the CBLP is managed by a single judge assigned in each county to handle cases in the program, thus providing each case with individualized case management and a jurist experienced in managing and resolving similar matters. On July 27, 2018, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted special rules for cases in the CBLP to take effect on September 1, 2018. The current rules in Parts I and IV will continue to apply to CBLP cases, unless contradicted by a new rule. The new rules, largely adapted from rules in the federal courts and other business courts, mainly modify certain aspects of case management, discovery, and motion practice. The more substantial practice changes prompted by the new rules are: Initial Disclosures: Following the federal courts’ innovation of requiring mandatory disclosures, litigants in the CBLP will be required to disclose early in the case: 1) all individuals with knowledge of information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, 2) copies or a description of (including the location of) all documents, electronic data, or tangible things that the party may use...

Wrap-Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2017-2018 Term

With the close of the United States Supreme Court’s 2017-18 term, we offer this wrap-up, focusing on decisions of special interest from the business and commercial perspective (excluding patent cases): In a much talked-about decision in the antitrust field, the Court held in Ohio v. American Express Co. that American Express’s anti-steering provisions in its merchant contracts, which generally preclude merchants from encouraging customers to use credit cards other than American Express, are not anticompetitive and therefore do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the Court found that credit card networks are two-sided transaction platforms, one side being the merchant and the other side being the merchant’s customer. Thus, when assessing whether the anti-steering agreements are anticompetitive, the effects on both sides of the platform must be considered. The plaintiffs’ proof that American Express had increased its merchant fees over a period of time was insufficient to show an anticompetitive effect because it neglected the customer side of the platform, where consumers have received the benefit of ever-increasing rewards from credit card companies and other improvements in services that those higher merchant fees enable. Bringing an end to a fight that New Jersey had been waging against the NCAA and professional sports leagues since 2012, the Court paved the way for...

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Appraisal Rights for Stockholders Who Relinquish Control of their Corporation Through Merger Involving a Special Merger Subsidiary

Delaware law generally grants appraisal rights to shareholders of corporations involved in statutory mergers or consolidations. But, what are the rights of shareholders when control of their corporation is relinquished through a merger between a specially-created merger subsidiary and another corporation? According to Chancellor Bouchard’s recent opinion, the shareholders have no appraisal rights because they do not own shares in a “constituent corporation in the merger.” Chancellor Bouchard also found that the shareholders are not entitled to appraisal rights because they will retain their shares in the parent corporation in the contemplated transaction. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., a privately-held corporation, wanted to combine their businesses. They therefore agreed to a so-called reverse triangular merger, pursuant to which (1) Dr. Pepper will create a new subsidiary, (2) that subsidiary will be merged into Keurig’s owner, Maple Parent Holdings Corp., and (3) Maple Parent will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dr. Pepper. In addition, Maple Parent will pay a $9 billion dividend to Dr. Pepper and receive enough shares in Dr. Pepper to give it a controlling 87% share of Dr. Pepper’s common stock. Maple Parent’s $9 billion payment to Dr. Pepper will then be used to help finance special cash dividends of $103.75 per share to Dr....

Wrap Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2016-17 Term

With the close of the United States Supreme Court’s 2016-17 term, we offer this wrap up of the term’s most important business and commercial cases (excluding patent cases): Kindred Nursing Ctrs, L.P. v. Clark: The Supreme Court continued its full-throated support of arbitration agreements, again rejecting a state supreme court’s effort to apply an ostensibly arbitration-neutral rule of law to invalidate an arbitration agreement. In Kindred, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement signed by an attorney-in-fact under a broad power of attorney was invalid because the power of attorney did not expressly give the attorney-in-fact the right to waive the principal’s right to a jury trial. According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, to grant an attorney-in-fact the authority to waive a “fundamental constitutional right,” a power of attorney must grant that authority expressly and unambiguously. Because the right to access the courts and the right to a jury trial are such “fundamental constitutional rights” and because the power of attorney did not expressly and unambiguously waive them, the attorney-in-fact was not authorized to agree to arbitrate the principal’s claims, and no enforceable arbitration agreement was created. The Supreme Court found that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s facially arbitration-neutral rule—that the authority to waive “fundamental constitutional rights” must be expressed unambiguously in a power...